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Preface 
Adults frequently provide compelling, detailed accounts of early childhood experiences in the 
courtroom.  Judges and jurors are asked to decide guilt or innocence based solely on these 
decades old memories using “common-sense” notions about memory.  These notions are not 
in agreement with findings from neuroscientific and behavioural studies of memory 
development.  Without expert guidance, it is difficult to see how judges and jurors can 
properly adjudicate the weight of memory evidence in cases involving adult recollections of 
childhood experiences. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Memory often serves as the key or only evidence in the courtroom.  Whether the witness is a 
child or an adult, all memory-based evidence is reconstructive.  This is because memories are 
not veridical records of experience but are fragmented remnants of what happened in the past, 
pieced together in a “sensible” manner according to the rememberer’s current worldview1,2.  
The reliability of memories may be questionable in general, but several additional issues 
should be considered when forensic evidence comes from adults recalling childhood 
experiences. These issues are the focus of this article.  
First, memories that are formed during childhood are different from memories formed 
during adolescence and adulthood in terms of both longevity and content.  These differences 
have important consequences for what judges and jurors should expect to hear from 
complainants when they testify about childhood experiences, especially the amount and type 
of details being remembered3 (Box 1).  Second, to be remembered in adulthood, childhood 
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memories must have been retained for considerable periods of time.  However, during that 
time memories can change or even disappear due to a process known as reconsolidation 6-7.  
 Many of these memory facts are not known by judges and jurors who must then rely 
on their own ‘common sense’ views of memory and memory development when evaluating 
the reliability of memory-based evidence. These views can be at odds8-12 with what has been 
revealed by the scientific study of memory and its development.  For example, many jurors 
and legal professionals (e.g., judges, lawyers, police) in North America8 and Europe (e.g., 
Sweden13 and Norway14) are naïve when it comes to understanding how memories are 
formed, how they become distorted over time, and how stress and emotion affect 
remembering15-16.  Jurors are similarly naïve when it comes to understanding whether children 
can remember events that happen only once, events that are traumatic, or which factors can 
affect the accuracy of memories across childhood (e.g., suggestibility, repeated 
questioning)17.  Indeed, these naïve but ‘common sense’ beliefs directly impact the verdicts 
jurors render in court18 (Box 2). 
The purpose of this article is to debunk these naïve beliefs by reviewing recent 
scientific advances from behavioural and neuroscientific studies concerning the development 
declarative memory during childhood. I also discuss factors that can influence the long-term 
retention of childhood memories and the effects of stress on memory.  Finally, I consider the 
implications of these findings for courtroom cases that involve evidence based on memories 
of childhood experiences.  
 
Development of declarative memory 
Declarative memory, also known as explicit memory, is memory of facts and experiences. 
When experiences are encoded with respect to the self, memory is considered 
autobiographical; that is, they are not just memories of events that happened, they are 
memories of events that happened to ‘me’.  It is this form of declarative memory that we are 
dealing with in the courtroom; namely, adults remembering experiences that happened to 
them when they were children.  In this section, I discuss the recent behavioral and 
neurobiological data concerning the development of autobiographical declarative memory 
from infancy through childhood. 
 
Findings from behavioral studies 
There is considerable evidence that most if not all memories from very early 
childhood (i.e., 18 to 24 months of age; infantile amnesia) are effectively lost, or are certainly 
not available to conscious recall1,19.  Research from studies in humans and nonhuman animals 
has shown that forgetting occurs more rapidly in younger members of the species20-23.  This 
increased sensitivity of early memories to forgetting extends into the preschool years24.   
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Therefore, it is not surprising that studies in adults show that very few events from early 
childhood are remembered, even events that occurred somewhat later in childhood (i.e., 
before the age of five to seven years; childhood amnesia) (see Figure 1).  
 Several phenomena that underpin the absence of autobiographical memories of early 
childhood experiences have emerged from behavioural studies.  Before these findings are 
described, it is important to note that autobiographical memory has an episodic component 
(the who, what, where, and when of an event, including the personal experience of the event)  
and a semantic component (factual information that is independent of the specific event in 
which that information was acquired, including the meaning of the event)1, 26, 27. To illustrate, 
I know not only that grapefruits are bitter (semantic knowledge (or semantic memory)) but 
also remember the first time I tasted the bitterness of a grapefruit (episodic memory).  
Episodic and semantic components develop in parallel throughout childhood and 
adolescence1, 26-28.  For example, younger children’s narrative recall of a recent event is 
sparser, containing fewer (particularly peripheral) details about the experience, than older 
children’s recall of a recent event1,28, suggesting that fewer details are stored in episodic 
memory in younger than older children. Accordingly, although young children are frequently 
correct in the basic facts of what happened (e.g., we went on a trip to the museum), their 
narratives do not contain many of the additional details (e.g., it was a warm and sunny day, I 
was wearing my favorite dress, we learned what a curator was) as older children’s. 
Parallel developments also occur in the semantic components of children’s 
autobiographical1, 27-29.  One way to study these developmental changes in the organization of 
semantic knowledge is by asking children to make similarity judgments among concepts or 
objects. Using multidimensional scaling analyses to calculate relational (or associative, that 
is, semantic) distances between these concepts, one can map how these distances change 
across age.  When 4-year-olds and 9-year-olds rated the same set of concepts for their 
similarity, different scaling solutions were obtained (Figure 2)29, indicating that older 
children’s knowledge base is organized differently (i.e., concepts are interrelated in a 
qualitatively different manner) than younger children’s in ways that can have direct 
behavioural consequences. For example, semantic distances between concepts for younger 
children predict confusions among those concepts for children of that age but not for older 
children.  Indeed, these distances have been used to predict susceptibility to memory illusions 
(e.g., spontaneous false memories)30-32 and to anticipate age-based changes in children’s 
vulnerability to suggestion29.  Interestingly, younger children (4- to 7-year-olds) generate 
fewer spontaneous false memories than older children (9- to 12-year-olds) and adults 28, 30-32.  
That is, when asked to remember a list of associatively related terms (e.g., nap, doze, pillow, 
bed, dream, … snore) younger children (e.g., 7-year-olds) remember fewer presented words 
than older children and adults, and are less likely to falsely remember the non-presented but 
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associated word sleep 28, 30-32.  This is thought to be because their knowledge base — or the 
semantic component of memory — is not as well developed as that of older children and 
adults.  This does not mean that spontaneous false memories do not occur in young children; 
they do, especially when age sensitive materials are used30-32.  
That age-appropriate materials increase false memory rates in children is critical when we 
consider what adults are remembering about their childhood experiences.  If one is truly 
recalling an event from childhood, then the language and concepts being used in that memory 
should correspond to the person’s knowledge base at the time of the event, and not to what 
they surmise to have been the case given their current adult worldview.  For example, the 
concept of disgust does not usually develop until approximately the age of 533, so memories 
involving this concept cannot have been encoded before that age. Indeed, there is evidence 
that the concepts and words used to retrieve true early memories are age-appropriate to the 
memories themselves34.  
A second, related, phenomenon that underpins childhood amnesia is that young children 
have considerable difficulty binding the different aspects of an event together into an 
integrated memory trace26.  Binding refers both to the integration of features encoded from 
the environment into a cohesive trace and the subsequent integration of this trace with 
information that is already stored in memory.  Binding captures both semantic relations (e.g., 
integrating elements such as bird with wings, feathers, flight) and episodic relations (e.g., 
location where one was when seeing an eagle capture a salmon).  There is some evidence that 
children are better at binding features of an event when those events are personally 
significant35. Nevertheless, the development of binding ability across childhood into 
adolescence facilitates encoding, storage, and retrieval processes.  Interestingly, these 
processes involve the hippocampus and the prefrontal cortex, areas that undergo structural 
and functional changes at this time36-38 (see below).  
What this behavioral evidence shows is that improvements that occur during childhood in 
the ability to encode, store, and retrieve information are associated with an increased ability to 
bind information into coherent memories.  This ability to identify relations between features 
helps to shape the child’s emerging knowledge base (including knowledge about the self) and 
enables the extraction of abstract (semantic) knowledge from episodic experiences.  As the 
ability to link newly encoded information into relational structures develops — along with the 
ability to integrate these structures with memories already in storage — more stable and 
better-integrated memories are stored, ones that not only contain more information but also 
may be better preserved over time.   
In addition, there is a third phenomenon associated with the fragility of early memories, 
namely, that their episodic components frequently deteriorate more rapidly than the meaning 
or core components39.  What this means is that although the central features of experiences 
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(e.g., that I went to a museum when I was young) are preserved in memory, additional 
(perhaps more peripheral) details of those experiences (e.g., what time of day the visit 
happened, what I was wearing, who I was with) are not.  It is this waning of episodic detail 
that can undermine the integrity and longevity of early memories, something that frequently 
leaves the adult rememberer with only vague (and decontextualized) recollections of the past4, 
39
 (Box 1).   
 A fourth phenomenon that underpins poor recollection of childhood memories is that 
information that has been stored only becomes stable and better integrated within important 
knowledge structures after several other cognitive changes have emerged.  For example, the 
emergence of the cognitive self at around 18 to 24 months40-41 provides a structure within 
which memories can be embedded, a development that leads to more stable, hence potentially 
longer-lasting, memories40-44.  Developments in language34, 44-47 (e.g., development of pronoun 
use) and the sharing of our past experiences with others45 (e.g., parents) also contribute to the 
restructuring and enhanced retention of children’s memories for recent experiences44-47.  
There is some debate regarding whether this restructuring of memories in childhood by adult 
conversation partners changes the contents of children’s memories or simply provides a 
culturally appropriate linguistic framework for talking about autobiographical experiences.  
Regardless, what is clear is that children’s conversations with parents about their 
autobiographical experiences, does increase the longevity of memories for these events46-47. 
Importantly, a common sense notion holds that emotional or traumatic events from 
our childhoods are remembered better than more neutral events. However, studies have 
consistently shown that adults’ earliest memories are not ones that are highly emotional or 
traumatic, but rather, are often devoid of emotional content4, 39.  This finding is not 
unexpected given that infants and young children do not have the level of semantic 
knowledge needed to encode the meaning (in adult terms) of an event; any meaning given to 
events is constructed later, when the fragments are retrieved.  In fact, when the details of a 
previously experienced event (e.g., a visit to a fire station) are known and can be compared to 
what is later recalled, young children’s (5- and 6-year-olds) subsequent recall rarely includes 
verbatim, emotional, temporal, or introspective information39.  Even specific questioning 
about the event does not elicit these details from young children, whereas older (9- and 10-
year-olds) children’s reports do contain such information39.  Thus, when adults provide 
detailed narratives (for example, in the courtroom; Box 1) for events experienced in early 
childhood, these narratives are unlikely to be based on memories alone and are likely to have 
been ‘filtered’ through the lens of the person’s current worldview.   
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Findings from neurobiological studies 
Of course, these behavioural changes in children’s memory development do not occur in 
isolation but rather, happen in tandem with, and to some extent are mediated by, important 
neurobiological changes. Developmental neuroscientists have documented these changes 
using an ever-growing toolkit with which to study brain development.  These include 
structural MRI, diffusion tensor imaging to study changes in brain structure, and EEG, ERP 
and functional MRI to study changes in regional activity and functional connectivity. Studies 
using these tools have shown that changes in brain structure and function occur throughout 
childhood and adolescence.  In terms of structure, cortical thinning (resulting in part from 
synaptic pruning) appears earlier in the primary sensory cortices than in the association 
cortices and the prefrontal cortex48-49, whereas white matter volume increases during 
development, mainly as a result of increases in myelination and axon diameter49-50.   
Findings from EEG/ERP studies suggest that early (e.g., the latter part of the first 
postnatal year) changes in structural and functional connectivity changes in the MTL and the 
PFC are associated with increases in the speed of information processing and in the longevity 
of memory traces51.  These changes in memory longevity (i.e., consolidation) involve 
maturation of MTL structures (e.g., hippocampus, parahippocampus, entorhinal and perirhinal 
cortices, and the dentate gyrus) into the latter part of the first postnatal year19.  These areas of 
the MTL continue to develop during the first few years of life52-54 and, together with changes 
in the dorsolateral (dl) PFC53, 55-57 serve to bind distributed representations into integrated 
memory traces. 
Neuroimaging studies have examined the brain areas (mainly the MTL and PFC) 
involved in memory formation and retrieval in individuals aged 8-24.  These include studies 
of both the automatic (memory processes that may not be under conscious control; e.g., 
feature sampling) and strategic (memory processes that are under conscious control; e.g., 
semantic clustering of to-be-remembered information) aspects of memory (both at encoding 
and retrieval) and studies of changes in children’s knowledge base56-63.  Results have shown 
that dlPFC regions that mediate the encoding of detailed episodic representations of 
experiences may have a protracted period of development than the MTL52, 56-63 (but see 64-66), so 
that memory formation early in childhood depends more on MTL contributions26, 36, 38, 67-68.  
Speculation is that early reliance on the MTL may lead to sparser representations in memory, 
but as development proceeds, contributions from the PFC facilitates the encoding of more 
detail, especially detail that involves semantic processing56, 66, 69, but also storing greater 
contextual and source information60.  These findings are consistent with the behavioral data 
showing that younger children have a qualitatively and quantitatively different knowledge 
base with more limited semantic processing than older children26-27.  Continued development 
of the hippocampus in middle childhood and adolescence also influences encoding and 
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retrieval66-67.  Indeed, a recent fMRI study examining activation of brain regions during 
memory retrieval in 8- and 12-year-olds and adults found that age-related increases in 
semantic memory errors were related to changes in the pattern of engagement of the left 
anterior MTL, left posterior parietal cortex, and the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 
(vlPFC)70. 
Memory results in the accumulation of both abstract knowledge (the semantic 
component of autobiographical memory) and contextual or source details of individual 
experiences (the episodic component of autobiographical memory).  Neuroimaging studies 
have found that memory formation is associated with activation in brain regions that are 
known to be content sensitive.  For example, a recent study58 showed that the formation of 
memory for scenes was associated with activation of cortical areas responsible for the visual 
perception of scenes (i.e., parahippocampal place area71).  Memory for natural scenes 
improves during childhood and adolescence through to adulthood72 , and these improvements 
correlate with changes in the activity of cortical areas specialized for processing scenes73 
during the encoding and subsequent representation of complex scenes.   
Other studies61 have examined the influence of changes in knowledge base and 
memory61.  Here, children (8.5 to 11.5 years of age) and adults participated in an encoding 
task that compared the encoding of noun-color pairings that either were matched with one’s 
world knowledge (e.g., seeing the word tomato printed on a red background) or were 
mismatched (e.g., seeing the word tomato printed on a blue background).  While being 
scanned, participants viewed word-color combinations and were asked if these combinations 
occurred in nature.  Later, outside the scanner, participants were given a recognition test. 
Behavioral studies have routinely demonstrated that when the noun-color pairings match, 
participants remember more of these items than when they mismatch.  In this study61 adults 
remembered more than children, but all participants exhibited the congruency effect (i.e., 
better recognition for congruent than incongruent pairings).  Neuroimaging data revealed that 
during the encoding phase, adults showed activity in regions known to be associated with 
semantic/conceptual processing (e.g., left PFC, parietal and occipito-temporal cortices), 
whereas children showed activity in regions that are involved earlier in the processing 
sequence (e.g., the right occipital cortex).  That is, in adults encoding relied more on neural 
substrates involved in semantic processing, whereas in children encoding relied more on 
neural substrates involved in perceptual processing.  Thus, consistent with the behavioral 
data, children’s knowledge base is less well developed than that of adults, perhaps relying 
more on perceptual-level than semantic-level processing.  As development proceeds, this 
perceptual to semantic shift depends on the ability to abstract knowledge from individually 
experienced episodes64 and this shift not only facilitates better correct recollection of 
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information, it also begets more semantic errors (false memories) in adulthood than 
childhood.  
In addition, increases in the functional connectivity of the PFC with regions in the 
MTL 38, 57 may also contribute to the emergence of cognitive control (e.g., strategies for 
encoding, monitoring retrieval contents)38  over memories. In terms of encoding, increased 
cognitive control lets children selectively attend to and store relevant versus irrelevant 
information, something that leads to better integrated and more detailed memories for 
experiences57.  For example, positive correlations between age (8- to 14-year-olds) and level 
of recruitment of left dlPFC have been obtained during encoding of complex scenes, which in 
turn resulted in increased memory for the contents of these scenes63.  In terms of retrieval, 
increased cognitive control lets children selectively remember and rehearse relevant 
information and selectively suppress or omit irrelevant information.  For example, when 
examining retrieval of memories in children (8- to 12-year-olds) and adults, differences in 
activation patterns in several PFC areas (left dlPFC, rostrolateral PFC, and vlPFC) were 
related to age70, suggesting developmental improvements in discriminating relevant from 
irrelevant information in memory and better, more flexible use of semantic retrieval cues74.   
Of course, additional changes in the MTL (e.g., changes in cortical thickness, hippocampal 
volume)64 also contribute to these developments in memory.  Indeed, there is evidence that 
age-related increases in the functional specialization of the hippocampus and the posterior 
parahippocampal gyrus may have an important role in the increasing ability to construct 
detailed memories with age58, 60. For example, in an fMRI study, 14-year-olds and adults 
showed similar activity profiles in the anterior region of the hippocampus when encoding 
source information, whereas 8- to 11-year-olds activity patterns were less differentiated60.  
Moreover, during retrieval of episodic information, activity in the anterior but not the 
posterior hippocampus was increased in adults, whereas children exhibited the reverse 
pattern67.  
Together, these neurobiological developments have a myriad of important 
consequences for how children encode, store, and retrieve their autobiographical experiences.  
Children become better at using selective attention to encode relevant information and engage 
in elaboration of information with information already stored in their knowledge base in order 
to better integrate autobiographical information in memory.  In addition, retrieval becomes 
more strategic (e.g., discriminating relevant from irrelevant memory contents, better use of 
semantic cues) and the contents of what is being retrieved are more likely to be filtered by 
monitoring processes, as children get older.  Many of these developments are contingent on 
changes in the PFC75   Indeed, the development of strategic retrieval is associated with 
increased activation in the left vlPFC, whereas developmental improvements in estimating the 
accuracy of what has been retrieved are associated with increased activation of the dlPFC70.  
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Given the intricate interconnections between of the PFC and the MTL, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the MTL also has a role in these improvements in retrieval67. 
Together, the neurobiological evidence shows that several structural and functional 
changes are associated with the development of encoding, storage, and retrieval abilities.  
These changes begin very early in life and continue through adolescence, and are both 
qualitative and quantitative in nature.  In addition, changes in encoding (e.g., increased 
binding), consolidation (e.g., greater longevity), and retrieval (e.g., strategic monitoring) 
processes contribute to an increased ability to interpret and remember experiences and to 
retain them over longer and longer retention intervals.  
 
Reconsolidation and long-term retention 
It is not just the nature of early memory development that is important when adjudicating 
memory evidence about childhood events in the courtroom, but also how well such traces are 
maintained over the ensuing decades.  Because our memories are used not just to remember a 
past and interpret our present but also to plan for and anticipate our future, our memory 
system needs to be dynamic and responsive to changes that occur with experience1,2.   
Reconsolidation is one process that allows memories to remain relevant, by updating them 
with current information76.  When traces are reactivated during their retrieval, they re-enter a 
labile state and must stabilize again (reconsolidation) if they are to persist6, 7.  It is during this 
reconsolidation process that memories are updated by new information through strengthening, 
weakening, changing, or even erasing what was already stored in memory.  Because we do 
not consciously register these reconsolidation processes, memories can be distorted or 
eliminated without our awareness. 
 Of course, it is obvious to most people that memories can be forgotten and that there 
are ways in which people can forestall such forgetting (e.g., through reinstatement and 
rehearsal, conversing with others about our experiences).  There is a considerable body of 
evidence showing that children’s ability to use forestalling strategies increases with age27, 77-80.  
However, these strategies themselves can have memory distorting consequences, ones that 
may lead to the blending of the current contents of one’s experiences (including suggestions 
or elaborations of information that occur during conversations with others, material extracted 
from newspapers, magazines, television, or social media) with information retrieved from 
memory28, 81. Because the contents of our current experiences can blend with what has been 
reactivated in memory, and these altered contents get reconsolidated in memory, attempts to 
forestall forgetting can have detrimental effects when trying to accurately recollect 
autobiographical events in the courtroom.  Indeed, the neuroscience underlying 
reconsolidation shows just how insidious these memory distortion processes can be, with the 
changes that arise as a result of reconsolidation not being privy to conscious inspection (e.g., 
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occurring at a neurochemical level)6, 7.  Thus, our rememberer will be blissfully unaware of 
these transformational processes and will never know whether what they are remembering 
actually happened, is some distortion of what occurred, or something that never happened at 
all.  
  
Effects of stress and trauma on memory 
There is another ‘common sense’ belief about memories of stressful and traumatic 
experiences, namely, that they are protected from being lost or distorted, being preserved 
outside of the experiencer’s conscious awareness (e.g., repressed) until a cue (e.g., a 
newspaper article, a TV program) suddenly brings them back into conscious awareness1, 28 
(see Box 2).  Indeed, stress and trauma can have either a positive (memory enhancing) or a 
negative (memory impairing) effect: extreme levels of stress impair memory, whereas 
moderate levels can strengthen memory82.  Although hormones released during stress (e.g., 
epinephrine, cortisol) modulate consolidation and memory strength, this does not mean that 
these memories are immune to forgetting, distortion, or even possible erasure82.  In addition, 
stress impairs retrieval, particularly of autobiographical memories82, and stress during 
reconsolidation can also lead to systematic distortions6, 7.   
Importantly, key changes in the systems that modulate stress take place during childhood. For 
example, the hippocampus and the amygdala change from early childhood through 
adolescence in terms of increased volume and increased connectivity between the amygdala 
and the hippocampus50.  There are also prolonged effects of stress (e.g., child maltreatment) 
on the developing brain that can involve alterations in the neural structures that underpin 
memory, including the hippocampus, amygdala and the medial PFC. Long-term stress has 
particularly deleterious effects on structures (e.g., hippocampus, basolateral nucleus of the 
amygdala) rich in glucocorticoid receptors83.   One consequence of long-term stress is poorer 
consolidation of emotional information, including through inhibition of neurogenesis, at least 
in rodents84-87, primates88, and possibly humans89-90.  Although the role of adult neurogenesis 
in memory consolidation in humans is hotly debated89-90, there is evidence91 that in adult 
humans, new neurons are added each day to the hippocampus at a rate commensurate with 
that found in nonhuman animal studies.  The role these new hippocampal neurons play in 
human memory is yet to be fully explored, although there is speculation that neurogenesis 
reduces interference between overlapping memories formed at different points in time91-92.  
Regardless, there is evidence that the inhibition of neurogenesis leads to poorer storage (and 
hence retention) of stressful memories in nonhuman animals84-88, 93.  Some of these negative 
effects of early life stress in human94-95 and nonhuman96 animals can be ameliorated by 
modifying the environment (e.g., by removing the stressor, social enrichment), but this effect 
depends not only on the timing of these changes but also on the timing, duration, intensity, 
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and frequency of exposure to stressors during development.  Overall, then, the fact that an 
event was stressful or traumatic is not a good predictor of a child’s (or an adult’s) subsequent 
memory for that event.   
 
Implications for the Courtroom  
Evidence in legal cases involving historic childhood experiences consists of complainant’s 
narrative recall of decades old memories.  These narratives are often remarkable not just for 
their detail but also the inclusion of concepts and knowledge (e.g., temporal information) that 
someone so young (e.g., 2 to 5 years of age) could not possibly have understood at the time of 
the event (Box 1).  If this knowledge was not available at that time, then how could such 
information have been encoded?  When an adult reconstructs an event from childhood, their 
current motivations and world knowledge (e.g., schemas) may fill in any ‘gaps’ in the 
memory. Thus, schema-driven reconstructive processes can lead to the creation of partially or 
entirely false memories.  Although aspects of such memories can be based on things that 
actually occurred (e.g., people and places involved in these alleged events do exist), it is 
difficult to know which aspects of memory evidence are ‘true’ and which are ‘false’ because 
there is no litmus test for the veracity of what has been remembered97.   
In these cases, judges and jurors may have to use “common sense” to evaluate the 
reliability of the memory-based evidence.  As I hope this article has demonstrated, the 
scientific study of memory does not support the ‘common sense’ notions (see Box 2) that 
many judges and jurors use in judicial cases in which adult recollections of childhood 
experiences serve as the only evidence.  First, cognitive and neurobiological changes during 
development affect how information is encoded, stored, and retrieved, and thereby constrain 
the content and durability of these memories.  Second, memories can change during the 
storage of new information through the process of reconsolidation.  Third, because memories 
are used to understand the world around us, what is extracted from stored experiences is 
abstract knowledge (semantic memory), often at the expense of the specific episodic details 
about that experience.  Thus, when we try to remember a specific childhood experience, the 
memory is often fragmentary and decontextualized, and meaning-based (semantic) 
reconstructive processes ‘fill in the gaps’ so that our narrative about these events appears 
sensible. 
 It is important that judges and jurors know that the contents of narratives about 
childhood events should be gauged with respect to the age of the person at the time the event 
was encoded24, 34.  Younger children’s (5- to 6-year-olds) narratives rarely include emotional, 
temporal, introspective, or verbatim information even when the children are directly 
questioned about these aspects of an event they had experienced34, 39.  Thus, if testimony 
about events that occurred early in childhood contains such elements, one should be skeptical 
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about the veracity of that information and not assume that this level of detail increases the 
credibility of the complainant’s narrative.  The important questions are: which parts of the 
narrative reflect things that probably did happen (if any); and how can we discriminate those 
facts from distortions that may have arisen through reconstructive remembering processes?   
Importantly, processes like reconsolidation occur outside of consciousness, and a 
rememberer will often not be aware that their memories have been transformed. This means 
that when judging the veracity of the narrative, it will not be useful to look for signs of 
deception (or assess levels of confidence). It is also important for jurors and judges to know 
that experiences that are encoded, stored, or retrieved during times of stress are not more 
likely to be remembered.  Indeed, stress can actually impair the encoding and storage of 
autobiographical experiences and reduce the ability to retrieve specific episodic information 
during subsequent recall attempts. 
These scientific findings stand in stark contrast to judges’ and jurors’ beliefs about 
memory and its development (see Box 2). This gap needs to be closed so that decisions about 
guilt or innocence in the courtroom reflect the scientific ‘truths’ about memory and not 
simply ‘common sense’ beliefs of judges and jurors.   This knowledge should help jurors and 
others to evaluate memory-based evidence properly and does not usurp, but rather aids the 
judges’ and jury’s primary role of deciding the guilt or innocence of the defendant.  Legal 
policy, procedures and practice need to change such that a memory expert’s evidence is given 
its proper weight when a defendant’s guilt or innocence is being determined primarily or 
solely on the basis of adults remembering childhood experiences.
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Box 1. Adults’ courtroom evidence of alleged memories of childhood events  
 
When asked to recall early childhood memories, adult narratives are frequently very sparse: “I 
remember sitting in the kitchen sink with a toy army man, not really sure how I reached the 
sink, but I remember that there was music”, or “I remember sitting in my parents’ bedroom, 
observing my mother as she did some house cleaning.  There is nothing else to the memory, 
but I remember having a very different perspective of the room at the time”4 (p. 572).  
 However, in the courtroom, such narratives surprisingly contain considerably more 
detail. An example is provided by early events being recalled by a complainant who alleged 
sexual abuse when she was three years old (all reports have been anonymised): “I was 
upstairs and I was playing in the spare room, and I was a bit upset.  I was wearing my favorite 
pink dress and I remember him coming up to me … and he just picks me up and he just sat 
me on his lap and gave me a really big squeeze.  He was wearing jeans and a t-shirt and 
would just sit there with his legs straight down in front of him.  When he picked me up he 
would sit me facing the same way, he just pulled me really close in to him … he had his arms 
around my waist.  I remember feeling uncomfortable.”  A similar level of detail was provided 
by another complainant when remembering an abusive event from the same age period: “I 
was in the house alone with him a lot of the time and he would take me into his room … he 
had a green solid pressed-wood headboard and blue flannel sheets on his bed.  He would just 
lie there on top of the sheets, just sitting up on the bed with big feather pillows behind his 
head and just lie me next to him, to his right … and then I remember him, he was rubbing 
himself with his right hand, and then he would say ‘why don’t you feel it too?’  I remember 
looking at him and then he would take my left hand and he would make me completely grab it 
and pleasure him.  I remember thinking, ‘this is disgusting’.”  Not only are these 
complainants’ narratives unusually rich in detail, they also contain concepts that are not 
normally available to children so young (e.g., handedness, disgust).  Moreover, oftentimes 
these unusually detailed memories also include verbatim conversations, conversations that 
most of us could rarely, if ever, remember some decades later.   
This is not to say that adults who have experienced trauma in childhood cannot 
remember these events, particularly if those events are still viewed by the person as salient, 
life-changing experiences5.  However, like all memories, recollection of traumatic 
experiences is reconstructive, subject to forgetting, and prone to error3.  For example, adults 
who recalled documented childhood sexual abuse experienced some 12 to 21 years earlier 
were able to accurately recollect core features of these experiences.  However, these 
narratives were sparse on peripheral information and contained reconstructive errors5.   
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Box 2. Science and belief about memory: Comparing what memory experts know with 
the common sense views of law enforcement professionals, judges, and jurors.  
 
Recent court decisions in the United States (e.g., State v. Coley; 32 S.W.3d 831; Tenn. 2000) 
and in the United Kingdom (R v. S; R v. W; 2006 EWCA Crim. 1404, Royal Courts of Justice, 
London, p. 9) have suggested that, “ it is difficult to see how … expert evidence can properly 
be tendered to establish a justifiable criticism of an adult witness who says that she suffered 
abuse throughout her childhood, which must have begun at too early an age for her to 
remember the first occasion [and who provided] highly specific details of abuse at such an 
early age. … the jury should consider their own experiences, searching their recollections for 
their earliest memories, and analysing what they could actually remember, and how far back 
their memories went.  They did not require, and would not have been assisted by the evidence 
of an expert.”  That is, “Eyewitness testimony has no scientific or technical underpinnings 
which would be outside the common understanding of the jury; therefore, expert testimony is 
not necessary to help jurors ‘understand’ the eyewitness’ testimony” (State v. Coley, pp. 833-
834). 
In an effort to understand whether ‘common sense’ views of memory are consistent 
with what the scientific study of memory has revealed, a number of researchers8-17 have posed 
questions about how memory operates to various legal professionals (lawyers, law 
enforcement officers, judges) as well as members of the general public who are eligible for 
jury service.  As it turns out, the common sense view of memory is frequently inconsistent 
with the findings from memory research.  For example, whereas potential jurors believe that 
memory acts like a video recorder accurately registering a person’s experiences, and that once 
recorded, such memories cannot be altered16, there is a wealth of evidence showing that 
memory is reconstructive and fallible28. 
Of particular relevance here, are studies that examine ‘common sense’ beliefs about 
early childhood memories.  For example, when 111 jurors (people summoned for jury duty), 
42 judges (with an average of 11.2 years on the bench), and 52 law enforcement personnel 
(detectives, police officers, with an average of 13 years experience) were asked a series of 
questions about memory, ones that had been asked earlier of memory experts, the findings 
showed that there was a serious deficiency in their understanding of how memory operates8.   
As illustrated in the following figures, relative to experts, those serving as law professionals 
and those evaluating memory evidence in court have only limited knowledge of issues 
concerning the memory issues relevant to how adults remember childhood experiences. 
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Effects of Post-event Information 
 
“Eyewitness testimony about an event often reflects not only what they saw but also 
information they obtained later on.”  [This statement is correct.  The figure depicts percentage 
agreement rates with the ‘post-event information’ statement. All three non-expert groups 
agreement rates were significantly lower than those of experts.] 
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Forgetting Rate 
 
“The rate of memory loss for an event is greatest right after the event and then levels off over 
time.”  [This statement is correct.  The figure depicts percentage agreement rates with the 
‘forgetting rate’ statement. All three non-expert groups agreement rates were significantly 
lower than those of experts.] 
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Child Witness Accuracy 
 
“Young children are less accurate as witnesses than are adults.”  [This statement is correct.  
The figure depicts percentage agreement rates with the ‘child witness accuracy’ statement.  
All three non-expert groups agreement rates were significantly lower than those of experts.] 
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False Childhood Memories 
 
“Memories people recover from their own childhood are often false or distorted in some 
way.”  [This statement is correct.  The figure depicts percentage agreement rates with the 
‘false childhood memories’ statement.  Two of the three non-expert groups (with the 
exception of judges) agreement rates were significantly lower than those of experts.] 
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Long-term Repression 
 
“Traumatic experiences can be repressed for many years and then recovered.”  [This 
statement is incorrect.  The figure depicts percentage agreement rates with the ‘long-term 
repression’ statement.  All three non-expert groups agreement rates were significantly higher 
than those of experts.] 
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Figure 1: A composite distribution of adult recall of 11,000 childhood memories (adapted 
from D. C. Rubin24).  Points along the distribution (Y-axis) represent the proportion of 
memories retrieved by adults, memories that were stored at different ages across their 
childhoods (X-axis). What these data show is a summary across several studies of 
autobiographical recall of childhood events by adults using different recall techniques24.  
What the results show is that people have very little memory for autobiographical experiences 
that occurred before the age of two, few memories for events that occurred between two and 
three years of age, and that the number of memories of events occurring later increases with 
the person’s age at the event. Importantly, it is not until around the age of seven that we begin 
to see mature levels of autobiographical remembering.  These data are consistent with the 
growing consensus25 that experiences occurring at or after the age of seven or eight can be 
reliably remembered in adulthood. It is perhaps prudent, then, that legal proceeding where 
memories of such events constitute the main or only evidence heed the advice in a report by 
the British Psychological Society25 that states, first, “In general the accuracy of memories 
dating below the age of 7 years cannot be established in the absence of independent 
corroborating evidence”; and second, “These findings lead to the conclusion that by 
approximately 9 to 10 years of age children have autobiographical memories that are adult in 
nature”.   
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Figure 2: Differences in (a) younger and (b) older children’s knowledge base using nonmetric 
multidimensional scaling solutions derived from INDSCAL models of children’s similarity 
ratings (adapted from Ceci et al.29).  These solutions show Euclidean distances between 
concepts for 4-year-olds and 9-year-olds and illustrate changes with age in how concepts are 
interrelated in semantic memory (knowledge base).  These differences in how concepts are 
clustered in memory predict the types of memory confusions experienced by children of 
different ages.  Indeed, Euclidean distance was a strong predictor of children’s confusions.  
Specifically, children were more likely to exhibit age-appropriate memory confusions 
between items actually presented and distractor items on a memory test for concepts more 
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closely clustered in semantic space (e.g., crab-lobster for 4-year-olds but spider-lobster for 9-
year-olds) than those less densely clustered.  These results not only illustrate how 
representations of concepts change in children’s knowledge base across age but also how 
these changes affect memory performance, particularly, memory confusions.  
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